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The South African Police Service (SAPS) struggles to protect victims from commercial crime 
that threatens the economy, corrodes scarce and valuable resources, and inhibits growth and 
development. Official SAPS statistics show that the annual detection rate in respect of reported fraud 
cases was 35.77% in 2014/15 and 34.08% in 2015/16. Although the detection rates for serious 
commercial crime are reported as 94.8% for 2014/15 and 96.75% for 2015/16, it is likely that these 
figures are inaccurate and, in reality, much lower. This article provides an overview of the reported 
incidence of commercial crime, assesses the detection rate reported by the SAPS, and seeks to 
determine how it can be improved. 
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Commercial crime has a profound impact 
on the economy, trade and society at large. 
Individuals, businesses, organisations and 
government suffer the consequences of these 
crimes, which are committed for financial gain 
and include fraud, theft, forgery, corruption, tax 
evasion, embezzlement, money laundering and 
racketeering, as well as facilitating, receiving and 
possessing the proceeds of crime. However, 
the relative lack of attention to and authoritative 
criminal sanction of commercial crimes in 
South Africa are of great concern. For example, 
various cartels that have colluded in price-
fixing and related corruption in the food, steel 
and construction industries in recent years, 
have merely received administrative penalties.1 
Furthermore, as will be seen from this article, 
commercial crime is under-reported, and the 
limitations of official statistics remain a challenge. 
This article reviews the data on commercial crime 
in South Africa, assesses its detection by police, 
and considers how it can be better tackled.
Commercial crime 
The concept of commercial crime is closely 
related to white-collar crime, financial crime and 
economic crime. The term white-collar crime 
was coined by sociologist Edwin H Sutherland in 
1939 and is defined as ‘crimes committed by a 
person of respectability and high social status in 
the course of his occupation’2 In 1970 Edelhertz 
extended the definition of white-collar criminality 
to include any ‘illegal act or series of illegal 
acts committed by nonphysical means and by 
concealment or guile, to obtain money 
or property, to avoid the payment or loss of 
money or property, or to obtain business or 
personal advantage’.3 
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The understanding and scope of white-collar 
crime have evolved and it now includes an 
array of different crimes that did not form part 
of the original concept. Terms such as financial 
crime, economic crime, commercial crime 
and corporate crime are used interchangeably 
with white-collar crime.4 The most prevalent 
characteristics of these crimes include the 
absence of violence, a motive of financial gain, 
an actual or potential loss, and an element 
of misrepresentation, concealment, deceit or 
a violation of trust.5 The SAPS uses the term 
commercial crime, which includes the criminal 
acts of fraud, embezzlement, theft of trust 
funds, corruption, forgery, uttering, money 
laundering and certain computer-related and 
cybercrimes, as well as statutory offences 
relating to finance, trade, commerce, business, 
corporate governance, tax, corruption, money 
laundering and the proceeds of crime and 
intellectual property, but excludes the physical 
misappropriation (theft) of moveable property.6 
The SAPS also distinguishes between general, 
less serious commercial crime and serious 
commercial crime.7
Investigation of commercial crime
Commercial crime is investigated primarily by 
the SAPS, as well as by non-SAPS government 
investigators and, in a private capacity, bank, 
corporate and private investigators. The legal 
framework for the investigation of crime is 
established by Section 205(3) of the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (Act 108 
of 1996), which places a legal obligation on the 
SAPS to prevent, combat and investigate crime. 
This is supported by the South African Police 
Service Act 1995 (Act 68 of 1995), the Criminal 
Procedure Act 1977 (Act 51 of 1977, the CPA) 
and various other statutes. 
The investigative capacity of the SAPS 
comprises four sub-programmes that fall under 
Departmental Programme 3: Detective Service, 
of which two (General Crime Investigations 
and Specialised Investigations) perform the 
actual investigation work while the others 
(Criminal Record Centre and Forensic Science 
Laboratory) provide investigation-related support 
and forensic services.8 The mandate for the 
investigation of non-serious commercial crime 
rests with the General Crime Investigation 
component of the Detective Service (i.e. station-
level detectives), while serious and priority 
commercial crime is investigated by the Serious 
Commercial Crime component of the Directorate 
for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI).9 In 
2016 a new national head, Commercial Crime 
was appointed outside of the DPCI and a 
Commercial Crime Unit under the control 
of the divisional commissioner, Detective 
Service was re-established, going back to the 
situation prior to the inclusion of the  former 
Commercial Branch in the DPCI in 2009.10 It 
is envisaged that the Commercial Crime Unit 
will investigate commercial crime cases not 
investigated by the DPCI, but which are too 
complex for investigation at station level. At least 
14 non-SAPS government-related institutions 
and agencies have a statutory mandate to 
investigate, inter alia, commercial crimes.11
Incidence of reported 
commercial crime 
The SAPS annually releases limited statistics 
relating to reported commercial crime. A 
distinction is made between general, less 
serious commercial crime and serious 
commercial crime. The SAPS has a tendency 
to equate general, less serious commercial 
crime with fraud.12 However, neither the number 
of new cases or complaints for all commercial 
crime collectively, nor the financial cost (losses) 
in respect of general, less serious commercial 
crime is published. Table 1 reflects reported 
commercial crimes for the period 1 April 2013 to 
31 March 2016.13 
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An issue for concern is that different sets of 
data have been published by the SAPS in 
respect of general, less serious commercial 
crime for the above period. The SAPS annual 
crime statistics show that 76 744, 67 830 and 
69 917 commercial crimes were reported during 
2013/14, 2014/15 and 2015/16 respectively.18 
The differences between the two sets of figures 
are quite significant and arguably warrant further 
investigation as to their accuracy and origin. 
If one compares the available SAPS commercial 
crime figures (i.e. fraud) for 2013/14 (79 109 
new cases) with that of fraud reported as 
serious commercial crime (4 271 new cases), 
the latter constituted 5.4% of the overall fraud 
cases received for investigation by the SAPS. 
Furthermore, a total of 13 839 persons were 
arrested for fraud during 2013/14; of those 
2 403 (17%) for serious fraud.19 
The above figures illustrate that significant losses 
can be attributed to those commercial crimes 
reported to the police. Almost R118 billion 
was lost between 2013 and 2015 as a result 
of reported serious commercial crime. During 
the two-year period 2012–2013 a total of 
170 678 new fraud cases were reported to 
the SAPS. During 2015/16, an average of 200 
commercial crimes were reported to the SAPS 
each day. Serious fraud made up more than 
5% of all reported fraud and about 66% of all 
serious commercial crime cases. In terms of 
geographical distribution, Gauteng has the 
highest incidence of fraud reported to the SAPS, 
at 33.9% in 2015/16.20 
According to the Global Economic Crime Survey 
2016, published by PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(PwC), which covers the period 2014 to 
2015, 69% of participants in South Africa 
had experienced economic crime during 
the reporting period.21 The most prevalent 
economic crimes were asset misappropriation, 
procurement fraud, bribery, corruption, 
cybercrime, human resources fraud, accounting 
fraud and money laundering. Apart from 
cybercrime the incidence of the other six types 
was higher than the global average. Cybercrime 
was on par with the global average. A total of 
60% of participants lost in excess of R500 000 
during the reporting period as a result of 
economic crime.22 
Taking into account the above figures, 
the enormity of commercial crime and its 
penetration into society, government and the 
business sector cannot be disputed. The under-
reporting of commercial crime exacerbates the 
situation, so that one can only imagine the real 
extent and consequences of commercial crime 
on the economy and society at large. 
Year
General, less serious 
commercial crime (fraud)
New complaints (cases) 
reported
Serious commercial crime
New cases 
reported
Actual loss
(R billion)
Potential loss
(R billion)
2013/14 79 109 6 20414 29.27 3.07
2014/15 69 831 3 95915 62.57 4.75
2015/16 71 756 3 77616 26.08 1.11
Total 220 696 13 93917 117.92 8.93
Table 1: Reporting of commercial crime to the SAPS – 1 April 2013 to 31 March 2016
Source: SAPS Annual Reports 2013/14 to 2015/16.
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Under-reporting
It is notoriously difficult to gauge the incidence 
and quantify the monetary impact of 
commercial crime on society and the South 
African economy. PwC found that gross under-
reporting by victims of economic crime is the 
norm in South Africa.23 For the period 2014 to 
2015, 66% of respondents surveyed indicated 
that they address incidents of economic crime 
internally, using in-house resources, rather than 
reporting it to the authorities. 
The Victims of Crime surveys 2014/15 and 
2015/16 show that, respectively, 26.8% and 
35.0% of consumer fraud incidents were 
reported to the SAPS.24 This suggests that 
about two-thirds of consumer fraud are not 
reported to the SAPS. The two main reasons 
for the low reporting rate are that victims have 
reported the crime to other authorities, and the 
perception or belief that the police could not or 
would not do anything about it. Bruce argues 
that crime is widely under-reported in South 
Africa and that official crime statistics issued 
by the SAPS do not accurately reflect the real 
crime situation.25 Crimes that require a police 
reference number for insurance purposes (e.g. 
housebreaking, robbery, vehicle theft and theft 
out of vehicle) are more likely to be reported. 
The above findings confirm that the incidence 
of commercial crime is in reality much higher 
than what is officially reported.
SAPS performance in respect of 
commercial crime investigation 
According to the SAPS Annual Performance 
Plan 2016/17 and the Performance Information 
Management Framework 2016/17, the purpose 
of the Detective Service is to perform (enable) 
the investigative work of the SAPS, including 
support to investigators in terms of forensic 
evidence and the Criminal Record Centre.26 
The strategic objective of the Detective Service 
is to contribute to the successful prosecution 
of offenders (crime), by investigating, gathering 
and analysing evidence, thereby increasing 
the detection rate of priority crime. The 
performance of the SAPS in respect of the 
investigation of crime is measured using three 
performance indicators, namely the detection 
rate, the trial-ready docket rate and the 
conviction rate.27 
Detection rate
The detection rate is an indication of successful 
investigations achieved in respect of the 
SAPS’s active investigative workload, which 
consists of new crimes reported to the SAPS 
as well as older cases that have not been 
finalised but are carried over from previous 
financial years.28 The detection rate measures 
the ability of the SAPS to solve crimes during 
investigation. The SAPS views a successful 
investigation as one that has resulted in the 
positive identification, arrest and charging of a 
perpetrator, cases that are withdrawn by the 
complainant before a perpetrator is charged, 
and cases where the public prosecutor 
declines to prosecute (‘nolle prosequi’ 
decisions), as well as unfounded cases.29 
The rationale for the inclusion of unfounded 
cases and cases withdrawn out of court in the 
detection rate is not clear. Since these cases 
often involve little or no investigation at all, it 
does not make sense to regard all of them 
as successful investigations. Yes, in certain 
cases where a suspect was identified and a 
considerable amount of time and resources 
spent on an investigation, only to be withdrawn 
by the complainant before any charge was 
brought, it might be argued that it was a 
successful investigation. However, there is 
no indication that factors such as time and 
resources spent are considered when deciding 
whether to include an unfounded case or a 
case withdrawn out of court in the detection 
rate. We argue that the blanket inclusion in 
the detection rate of all unfounded cases and 
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cases withdrawn out of court before a suspect 
is charged, results in a skewed picture of the 
actual ability of the SAPS to solve crime.     
The SAPS’s Crime Administration System (CAS) 
is the system used to register crime incidents 
for investigation, i.e. case dockets.30 The SAPS 
uses the terms ‘complaints reported’ and 
‘charges reported’ interchangeably.31 When a 
criminal complaint is reported, a case docket 
is opened and allocated for investigation. 
A case docket can result in more than one 
charge being brought against a suspect (i.e. 
the accused, as soon as s/he is charged). 
The detection rate is based on charges, and 
calculated using the Crime Management 
Information System (CMIS), also known as the 
SAPS6. Data used by the CMIS are extracted 
directly from CAS.32 
The detection rate is calculated as follows: 
[(Number of charges referred to court for the 
first time during a reporting period) + (Number 
of charges withdrawn before court) + (Number 
of charges closed as unfounded)] divided by 
[(Number of charges reported) + (Number of 
charges brought forward from the previous 
reporting period)] x 100 percent.33
Detection rate for commercial crime
The SAPS does not report a detection rate 
for general, less serious commercial crime. 
However, it does report a detection rate for 
fraud (see Table 2). 
Detection rate for serious commercial crime
The reported annual detection rate for serious 
commercial crime for the years 2013/14 to 
2015/16 is listed in Table 2. 
It should be noted that the detection rate for 
serious commercial crime is extremely high in 
comparison with the overall detection rate for 
less serious commercial crime (i.e. fraud overall). 
Scrutinising the reported detection rate for 
serious commercial crime reveals that the SAPS 
has likely calculated this indicator incorrectly 
and that its performance is in reality noticeably 
weaker. Although it is difficult to gauge the 
accuracy of the reported detection rate without 
the original data used by the SAPS, one can 
still get a good sense of it, using available 
public data.34 
The detection rate for serious commercial 
crime is calculated as follows: 
[(Number of charges referred to court for the 
first time, where a case represents at least 
one charge) + (Number of additional verifiable 
charges referred to court for the first time) + 
(Number of complaints withdrawn out of court) 
+ (Number of complaints unfounded/false)] 
divided by [(Number of cases/complaints 
reported, where a new case represents at 
least one charge) + (Number of additional 
verifiable charges referred to court for the first 
time) + (Number of charges brought forward, 
where a case represents at least one charge)] 
x 100%.35 Using the above formula, one can 
substitute data from the SAPS Annual report 
2014/15 as follows:36
Detection rate = 94.8% = 100% x [(Charges 
referred to court for the first time) + (Additional 
verifiable charges referred to court for the 
first time) + (Charges withdrawn before/out of 
Year
Detection rate 
for fraud
Detection rate 
for serious 
commercial 
crime
2013/14 36.72 89.7
2014/15 35.77 94.8
2015/16 34.08 96.75
Table 2:  Reported annual detection rate  
 for fraud and serious commercial  
 crime, respectively, 1 April 2013 to  
 31 March 2016
Source: SAPS, Annual report 2013/14, 160, 174; SAPS, 
Annual report 2014/15, 195; SAPS, Annual report 2015/16, 
175, 200; SAPS, Annual Performance Plan 2016/17, 40.
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court) + (Charges unfounded)] / [(New charges/ 
complaints reported) + (Charges brought 
forward from previous years) + (Additional 
verifiable charges reported)]
Whereas,
New charges/complaints reported = 3 930 (one 
case is equivalent to one charge)
Total charges referred to court for the first time 
= 126 953
Charges referred to court for the first time = 
2 422 (one case is equivalent to one charge)
Additional verifiable charges referred to court = 
(126 953 – 2 422) = 124 531
for the first time
Total charges reported = 128 623 (sum of 
new charges reported and additional verifiable 
charges reported i.e. referred to court) 
Therefore,
One can estimate the sum of the number of 
charges withdrawn before (out of) court and 
unfounded charges at between 0% and 100% 
of the new charges reported (3 930), since it is 
likely that the bulk of charges withdrawn and 
unfounded originate from new charges reported. 
Therefore, the number of charges brought 
forward from previous years is estimated to be 
between 5 456 and 9 601.37 
While a total of 126 953 charges, linked to 
2 422 cases, were referred to court for the 
first time during the period (i.e. an average 
of 52 charges per case docket), it is highly 
unlikely that the actual number of charges 
still under investigation brought forward from 
the previous year can be so low. What the 
SAPS is actually doing is substituting the 
number of case dockets brought forward with 
charges, where a docket is equal to a charge, 
while totally disregarding a large number of 
charges still under investigation, brought 
forward from previous years. To this end 
the SAPS acknowledges its own limitations 
and challenges insofar as the detection rate 
for serious commercial crime is concerned, 
stating that ‘new cases reported cannot be 
kept accurately [sic] in terms of charges, since 
charges added to an accused in practice are 
only formulated months, even years, after the 
case is initially received … in practice, charges 
are formulated when the investigation is 
completed and the state prosecutor formulates 
the charge sheet’.38 
By implication it is impossible to keep 
accurate statistics relating to newly reported 
serious commercial crime. However, the 
SAPS fails to explain what happens as the 
investigation progresses and possible charges 
are identified and investigated. In reality, 
charges contemplated against a suspect are 
investigated over a period of time and are 
known to both the investigating officer and 
state prosecutor well in advance of compiling 
the charge sheet.39 However, these charges 
are not taken into account when calculating the 
detection rate before a suspect is charged. This 
results in an inaccurate detection rate, which 
does not reflect the actual detection capabilities 
of the SAPS across all outstanding charges still 
under investigation. 
Although no raw data is available in respect of 
the serious commercial crime detection rate 
for 2015/16 (i.e. 96.75%), logic dictates that 
in order to achieve such a high performance, 
the raw figure for charges referred to court 
would have had to be in the same order as that 
of 2014/15 (probably between 126 000 and 
130 000 charges). In 2015/16 a total of 3 776 
new cases/charges were reported.40 It would 
be impossible to refer such a high number of 
126 953 + (Charges withdrawn before/
out of court) + (Charges unfounded)
3 930 + 124 531 + (Charges brought 
forward from previous years)
= 0.948
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cases) increases, the detection rate decreases 
against a fixed total for charges withdrawn 
before/out of court and unfounded charges (a 
sum of 1 000 in the example). The detection 
rate drops to as low as 32.9% if an average of 
40 charges are investigated per docket brought 
forward. If one uses a ratio of 52 charges per 
case docket brought forward (i.e. the ratio of 
charges per docket referred to court for the first 
time in 2014/15) and entirely remove charges 
withdrawn before/out of court and unfounded 
charges from the formula, the detection rate 
would be as low as 30.8%, while the SAPS 
reports that it is 94.8%.42 
A further challenge relates to the accuracy of 
SAPS data, for example in the 2013/14 financial 
year.43 During this period the number of new 
charges reported was 87 615, while the total 
number of charges referred to court for the first 
time was 83 913 (of which 3 417 were new 
charges referred to court for the first time on 
new cases). A total of 6 204 new cases were 
received for investigation. If one deducts this 
from the new charges reported (87 615), the 
number of additional verifiable charges referred 
charges to court from a relatively small pool of 
between 9 000 and 14 000 charges.41 
Table 3 illustrates the relationship between the 
sum of charges withdrawn before/out of court 
and unfounded charges on the one hand, and, 
on the other, charges brought forward from 
previous financial years, based on a 94.8% 
detection rate and a number of 3 930 new 
charges reported (2014/15 figures). 
Charges withdrawn 
and
charges unfounded
Charges brought 
forward
0 5 456
200 5 667
400 5 878
600 6 089
800 6 300
1 000 6 511
Table 3: Relationship between the sum of 
charges withdrawn before/out of 
court and unfounded charges, 
and charges brought forward from 
previous years, using figures for the 
2014/15 serious commercial crime 
detection rate
Source: Calculations performed by authors, using available 
SAPS data for 2014/15.
Based on a total of 1 000 charges withdrawn 
before/out of court and unfounded charges, 
the variation in the detection rate in relation to 
the number of charges linked per case docket 
brought forward from previous years, is shown 
in Table 4.
Table 4 is based on a total of 1 000 charges 
withdrawn before/out of court and unfounded 
charges against varying charges per docket 
ratio for cases brought forward from previous 
financial years.
Table 4 shows that as the charges to case 
docket ratio for cases brought forward (‘old’ 
Charges per case 
docket ratio for 
dockets brought 
forward from 
previous financial 
years
Detection rate
   1 94.8
10 66.1
20 49.5
30 39.5
40 32.9
50 28.2
60 24.6
Table 4: Serious commercial crime 
 detection rate
Source: Calculations performed by authors, using available 
data for 2014/15.
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to court for the first time should be 81 411. 
If the 3 417 new charges referred to court 
for the first time are deducted from the total 
charges referred to court for the first time 
(83 913), one should also get the number of 
additional verifiable charges referred to court for 
the first time. However, this calculates to
80 496 charges, which is different from the 
81 411 calculated previously. The difference 
in these two figures raises doubts as to the 
accuracy of the data. Furthermore, it is not 
clear from the detection rate formula whether 
the additional verifiable charges reported or 
referred to court for the first time stem from the 
new charges/complaints (cases) reported, from 
charges brought forward from previous years, or 
from both. 
Additionally, and as discussed earlier, the fact 
that the detection rate includes all complaints 
withdrawn before/out of court before anyone 
is charged, as well as unfounded complaints, 
contributes to an inaccurate reflection of the 
SAPS’s performance in respect of serious 
commercial crime. This amounts to an irregular 
inflation of the detection rate, based on fictitious 
successes. Against the above backdrop it is 
argued that multiple significant inaccuracies 
can be found in relation to the detection rate 
for serious commercial crime as reported by 
the SAPS, and that the actual detection rate is 
much lower.44  
Conclusion and recommendations
Despite limited successes achieved by law 
enforcement in combatting commercial crime, 
serious concerns exist over the lack of data 
available in the public domain to assess the 
performance of the SAPS in this regard, as 
well as the accuracy and trustworthiness of 
the serious commercial crime detection rate in 
particular. Burger, Gould and Newham make a 
valid point, stating that, from an analytical point 
of view, accurate and reliable crime statistics are 
needed to develop appropriate crime reduction 
strategies.45 Besides, inaccurate and unreliable 
statistics have negative effects, including an 
increase in public mistrust in the police, as well 
as an increased perception and fear of crime. 
Accurate, reliable and timely crime statistics 
enable members of the public to make informed 
decisions about their own safety and security, 
promote trust in the police and government, and 
encourage citizens to become involved in crime-
prevention initiatives.46  
The detection rate for all fraud is the lowest it 
has been in three years (34.08% in 2015/16), 
yet reported commercial crime has risen by 
about 3% since 2014/15. The actual serious 
commercial crime detection rate is estimated 
to be between 30% and 40% (based upon a 
charge to docket ratio of 30 to 40). Considering 
that the detection rate includes cases withdrawn 
by complainants, cases where prosecution has 
been declined, and unfounded cases, the SAPS 
needs to significantly improve its performance. 
Almost two-thirds of all reported commercial 
crimes go unsolved, and adding to this is the 
notable under-reporting of commercial crime 
incidents. Whichever way one looks at this, 
it is clear that the SAPS is not coping with 
commercial crime and is slowly but surely 
losing the battle. PwC reports that 70% of 
respondents interviewed regarded the SAPS 
as inadequately resourced and trained to deal 
with economic crime.47 The question should 
be asked as to why such a large percentage 
of respondents hold this view. What were their 
experiences in this regard and how can the 
situation be addressed or improved? The SAPS 
should take a hard look at its performance in 
this area and find appropriate measures to 
improve it. We propose an in-depth inquiry into 
the low detection rate and unsatisfactory impact 
of police efforts on these crimes, involving 
knowledgeable role players from the public and 
private sector to help find appropriate solutions. 
These could include training interventions, 
mentorship programmes, and the revision 
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and updating of training material related to 
commercial crime investigations.48  
In addition, we believe that the SAPS needs to 
address several issues:
•  Under-reporting of commercial crime. The 
SAPS should develop and implement an 
access-controlled online reporting platform 
for commercial crime. Complaints that do not 
require investigation should be recorded using 
a simple one-page template (similar to the old 
‘crime chart’), instead of opening a docket. 
This should save time and costs spent on 
docket administration.
•  Revision of formula for calculating the 
detection rate of crime. The current formula 
should be amended to exclude those 
complaints withdrawn before/out of court 
and unfounded complaints in respect of 
which a certain amount of actual investigation 
has not been done. Only complaints where 
the investigation has reached a reasonably 
advanced stage should be included in 
the detection rate. This will enhance the 
trustworthiness and reliability of crime 
statistics and provide a more accurate picture 
of reality.  
•  Discrepancy in data for fraud/commercial 
crime detection rate. An independent audit 
of SAPS statistics is proposed to determine 
reasons for the differences in reported fraud 
and commercial crime figures from annual 
crime statistics and annual reports, as 
published by the SAPS on its website. 
•  Inaccurate detection rate for serious 
commercial crime and lack of sufficient 
data. The CAS should be adapted to enable 
users to capture large numbers of charges 
against a suspect in an efficient manner. 
Performance management systems for 
commercial crime should include all charges 
under investigation brought forward from 
previous financial years when calculating the 
detection rate. If statistics relating to charges 
referred to court can be kept, it should be 
plausible to do the same for charges still 
under investigation. The use of manual 
statistical systems should be phased out and 
only computerised systems allowed (CAS and 
CMIS). The SAPS should also publish all raw 
data used during calculations.
• Improving commercial crime statistics. A 
comprehensive breakdown in this regard  
should be published at least twice a year 
to include different crime types/categories, 
modus operandi trends, victims/targets, 
and geographical incidence of crimes. The 
same should be done for cases reported 
as ‘other fraud’ under serious commercial 
crime. We argue that in order to effectively 
combat commercial crime, law enforcement 
should maintain an accurate, reliable regime 
of regular crime threat and crime pattern 
analyses, designed to review, adapt and 
strengthen crime-fighting strategies. 
In conclusion, we advocate more accurate, 
reliable, timely and comprehensive commercial 
crime statistics that should be made available to 
relevant role players who can assist to assess 
problem areas and develop effective combatting 
strategies. This should strengthen efforts to 
combat these crimes across the commercial 
crime landscape. 
To comment on this article visit 
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
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